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How Do Female Spouses’ Political Interests Affect Male Spouses’ Views About a 
Women’s Issue? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper explored how the degree of female spouses’ political interest 
affects male spouses’ views about women’s empowerment, using individual level 
data in Japan. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects, results 
showed that males were likely to consider women’s empowerment important if 
their spouses were interested in politics. This spouse effect was observed for 
conservative males but not for progressive-neutral males. Results were 
unchanged when the endogeneity bias caused by spouses’ political interests were 
controlled for. These findings suggest that female family members’ political 
interests and views play an important role in determining male views regarding 
women’s issues. 
 
Keywords:  Spouse, political opinion, women’s empowerment 
JEL : D72, D83, J12, J16 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
How and why is an individual’s preference influenced by the environment? A 
growing amount of research has examined this question. Some studies have 
explored the influence of fathers, mothers, and siblings on a family member’s 
decision making (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2000; Fernandez et al., 2004; Kawaguchi & 
Miyazaki, 2009; Sacerdote, 2007).1  In addition, gender gaps in views about 
political issues have been increasingly observed (Goldin, 1990).2 For instance, it 
has been found that females are more likely than males to consider growth in 
social welfare spending important (Funk & Athmann, 2008) and to support 
left-wing policies (Edlund & Pande, 2002).3 If this is the case, from the viewpoint 
of economics, a wife's political interest affects her husband’s view and is thought 
to play a critical role in income redistribution policy.  
These findings prompt the following question: How is an individual’s political 
view affected by the gender of family members or spouses? Previous studies have 
provided evidence that offspring gender has a critical influence on parents’ views 
about gender (e.g., Warner, 1991; Warner & Steel, 1999; Washington, 2008).4 
Edlund and Pande (2002) have suggested that the gender gap in political views 
                                                   
1 In the area of public choice, family is treated as a decision-making unit with 
intergenerational transfer when a voting model is constructed (Breyer & von der 
Schulenburg, 1990). 
2 Cebula and Meads (2008) have researched the determinants of gender difference related to 
voter turnout. 
3 According to historical works, it is acknowledged that women's suffrage has had a critical 
influence on size of government and the allocation of public spending (e.g., Abrams & Settle, 
1998; Aidt & Dallal, 2008; Lott & Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008).  
4 Washington (2008) has reported that men with daughters tend to support policies giving 
benefits to females, implying that fathers’ political views are affected by their daughters. 
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decreases following marriage, whereas the gap increases following divorce. 
Intuition suggests that the extent of influence of opposite sex family members 
would depend on their political interest. That is, the degree of a wife’s or 
daughter’s political interest would be associated with the husband’s or father’s 
political view. In this case, the husband’s or father’s general political position 
should also be considered. However, the relationship between a husband’s and 
wife’s characteristics in relation to political views has not been sufficiently taken 
into account when male political views have been analyzed. To examine this issue, 
using individual level data in Japan, this paper investigated the effect spousal 
political interest had on male views about women’s empowerment. Furthermore, 
this effect was compared in conservative and progressive-neutral males.  
 
Data 
This paper used individual level data including demographic characteristics 
(age and sex), household income, education, and political position.5 In addition, 
spouse’s political interest was also considered. Data were constructed from the 
Japanese Election and Democracy Study 2000 survey (JEDS hereafter) conducted 
in all parts of Japan in 2001. A total of 2500 adults (aged 20 years or older) were 
invited to participate in a survey with stratified two-stage random sampling. The 
survey collected data on 1618 adults, resulting in a response rate of 64.7%. There 
                                                   
5 The data for this secondary analysis were from the "Japanese Election and Democracy 
Study 2000 Survey: Social Capital and Perception of Democracy in Japan.” Data were 
gathered in 2000 by the JEDS research group (Yoshitaka Nishizawa, Hiroshi Hirano, 
Ken’ichi Ikeda, Ichiro Miyake, and Aiji Tanaka). Data were provided by the Social Science 
Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of 
Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
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were 180 sample points divided into 11 areas. According to population size, cities 
and towns were divided into 5 groups including 13 metropolitan cities, cities with 
at least 200,000 people, cities with at least 100,000 people, and other cities, towns 
and villages.  
The construction of samples used in this research is shown in Table 1. The 
original sample contained 1618 observations; 749 were males. Sample size was 
reduced to 478 when some observations were deleted due to missing values for 
views about women’s empowerment and respondents’ characteristics such as age, 
household income, education or marital status. Furthermore, after excluding 
observations without valid answers for spouse’s political interest, the sample size 
became 419. The remaining observations divided into progressive-neutral and 
conservative males were 239 and 180, respectively. These observations were used 
for the probit estimation, and results are shown in Table 3. To control for 
endogeneity bias caused by spouse’s political interest, I restricted the sample to 
males with spouses whose ages were available because spouse’s age was used as 
an instrumental variable. This additional selection further reduced the samples.6 
Results using these samples are reported in Table 5.  
Variables used for estimation are as follows. The dependent variable was 
whether respondents thought women’s empowerment important, measured using 
the question “In the list, please choose all that you think are important.” 
Respondents could choose numbered statements from among the list, which 
                                                   
6 It should be noted that selection bias occurred due to restricting samples to males with 
spouses. Controlling for both endogeneity bias and sample selection bias should be required 
and is a remaining issue in future research. 
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included “women’s empowerment in public affairs.”7 The key variable capturing 
spouse’s interest in politics was measured by the question “Is your spouse 
interested in politics?” Response choices were “interested” or “not interested.” 
Control variables were males’ ages, household incomes, and years of education.  
Women’s empowerment was presumed to be important for females but not for 
males. Therefore, we anticipated that male views about women’s empowerment 
would be influenced by spouses. Twenty-three percent of males with spouses and 
19% of males without spouses thought that women’s empowerment was 
important. Therefore, males with spouses were more likely to think women’s 
empowerment important than males without spouses, implying that male views 
about women’s issues appear to depend on the presence of a spouse. This finding 
is consistent with previous works (e.g., Warner, 1991; Warner & Steel, 1999; 
Washington, 2008). After further restricting the sample to males with spouses, 
31 % of males with spouses who were interested in politics and 20 % of males with 
spouses who were not interested in politics thought that women’s empowerment 
was important. This shows that males with spouses interested in politics were 1.5 
times more inclined to think women’s empowerment important than males with 
spouses not interested in politics. It can be concluded that males seem to be 
influenced not only by family structure but by a family member’s attitude 
towards politics.  
Male political position was measured by the question “If progressive is “0” and 
conservative is “10,” what do you think might best indicate your own position?” 
                                                   
7 The list contained 10 choices. Excluding women’s empowerment, choices were not 
associated with gender issues.  
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Responses ranged from 0 (progressive) to 10 (conservative). Therefore, males who 
chose 0 to 4 and males who chose 6 to 10 were considered progressive and 
conservative, respectively. Those who chose 5 were seen as neutral. Figure 1 
presents the distribution of male political position and shows that most males 
were neutral. I divided the sample into two groups: progressive-neutral (0-5) and 
conservative (6-10). Table 2 displays means of variables for progressive-neutral 
and conservative male groups. The rate of respondents who considered women’s 
empowerment important was 0.24 in the progressive-neutral group; the rate was 
0.19 in the conservative group. The difference between the two groups was 
statistically significant. Therefore, consistent with intuitive thought, respondents 
in the progressive-neutral group were more likely to consider women’s 
empowerment important than those in the conservative group. The rate of 
spouses interested in politics in the progressive-neutral group (0.23) was slightly 
higher than in the conservative group (0.21). The difference between them was 
not, however, statistically significant. It should be noted that this finding does not 
suggest that progressive males are more inclined to choose more political females 
as spouses.8 Furthermore, the progressive-neutral group was younger and more 
educated than the conservative group. 
 
Methods 
I explored how the degree of a spouse’s political interest affected a male’s 
political opinion about women’s empowerment. The estimated function takes the 
                                                   
8 It seems appropriate to conjecture that a male’s political position has an influence on his 
spouse's political interest. This effect appears to result in estimation bias and should be 
controlled for in future studies.  
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following form:  
Women’s empowerment imn = 0 + 1 (Spouse dummy) imn +2 (Spouse dummy)* 
(interest in politics dummy) imn + 3 Ln (age) imn +4Ln (household income) imn 
+5Ln (years of education) imn +em+ fn + uimn , 
where Women’s empowerment imn represents the dependent variable in 
individual i, city size m, and area n. Regression parameters are symbolized by ’s. 
Unobservable area specific effects are represented by em and fn, which are 
controlled by dummy variables, and uimn represents the error term. The empirical 
model was estimated using Probit analysis. The dependent variable, Women’s 
empowerment, was coded 1 if women’s empowerment was thought to be 
important, otherwise it was 0. Spouse dummy was 1 if the male had a spouse, 
otherwise it was 0. As previously indicated, a male’s view about a women’s issue 
depended on whether he had a spouse. Spouse dummy was expected to take the 
positive sign. Interest in politics dummy was coded 1 if a spouse was interested in 
politics, otherwise it was coded 0. The key variable was the interaction term 
between Spouse dummy and Interest in politics dummy, which captured how the 
degree of a spouse’s political interest affected the male’s political view. As 
mentioned previously, a male’s view about a women’s issue was affected by the 
spouse’s political interest; (Spouse dummy)* (interest in politics dummy) was 
expected to yield the positive sign. In addition, males’ ages, household incomes, 
and years of education were included to control for individual characteristics. 
I conducted the estimation using all samples. Then, to compare effects of male 
political position, samples were split into progressive, progressive-neutral, and 
conservative males. Separate estimations were carried out using these split 
8 
 
samples. As mentioned earlier in the Data section, a male’s political position 
could seemingly affect choice of females, resulting in endogeneity bias. Therefore, 
I restricted the sample to males with spouses and used the Probit model with 
endogenous regressors to control for this bias.9 Although, in traditional Japanese 
society, females tended to follow along with their husbands or parents, this has 
been increasingly changing (Hendry, 1981). In modern Japan, the social position 
of females has improved, and females have become influential in society. This 
change reflects the Equal Employment Opportunities Law for Men and Women, 
enacted in 1985 to improve employment opportunities for females. Younger 
generations of females are more likely to be appreciated and benefit from the law. 
Consequently, they are different in social position from older generations, 
resulting in differences in political position across generations. Hence, spouse’s 
age was used as the instrumental variable because spouse’s age is thought to be 
related to spouse’s political interest, but not with the error term uimn.  
 
Results 
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the Probit estimations. Table 5 displays the 
Probit model with endogenous regressors. 
As defined previously, based on the index for male political position ranging 
from 0 (progressive) to 10 (conservative), I divided the sample into 
progressive-neutral (0-5) and conservative (6-10) groups.10 These subsamples 
                                                   
9 The Probit model with endogenous regressors uses instruments for endogenous variables. 
The software used for the estimation was Stata 10. 
10 As seen in Table 1, progressive group samples were very small, so I combined progressive 
and neutral groups. When I included city size and area dummies, some samples were 
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were used for estimations. One might regard people rating themselves as 4 or 6 to 
be neutral rather than progressive or conservative. Therefore, it was important to 
examine the sensitivity of estimation results to changes in definitions of male 
political position. For this purpose, I also defined the sample (0-3) or (0-4) as the 
progressive group, the sample (0-6) as the progressive-neutral group, and the 
sample (7-10) as the conservative group. Then I alternatively defined subsamples 
used for estimations. Definitions of subsamples are exhibited in the political 
position row in Tables 3, 4, and 5.  
Table 3 (A) displays results of Spouse dummy. Added to it, Table 3(B) exhibits 
its interaction term with Interest in politics dummy. In the first row, Spouse 
Dummy produced both negative and positive signs, while being statistically 
insignificant. I found it interesting that a male’s political view about women’s 
empowerment was not dependent on having a spouse. Regarding the spouse’s 
political interest effect, it can be seen from (Spouse dummy)* (interest in politics 
dummy) in columns (8)-(14) that positive signs were produced in all estimations, 
congruent with anticipated results. (Spouse dummy)* (interest in politics 
dummy) was statistically significant, as seen in column (8), indicating that 
spouse’s political interest increased the likelihood that males considered women’s 
empowerment important. After splitting the sample, results for conservative 
males in columns (13) and (14) were statistically significant, but results for 
                                                                                                                                                              
discarded. Sample size of the progressive group, defined by a political position value of (0-3), 
reduced to only 11 if these dummies were included. To increase sample size, I did not include 
city size and area dummies when the progressive group was estimated. Results of the 
progressive-neutral and conservative groups did not change even when these dummies were 
excluded.    
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progressive males in columns (9) and (10) and progressive-neutral males in 
columns (11) and (12) were not significant. Therefore, it can be argued that a 
spouse’s political interest has a greater influence on a conservative male’s 
political view about women’s empowerment. 
Table 4 reveals that Interest in politics dummy was positive in columns 
(15)-(21) and statistically significant in columns (1), (17), (20) and (21). 
Additionally, results were considered after controlling for endogeneity bias caused 
by a male’s choice of spouse. As exhibited in column (22) of Table 5, when all 
samples are used, Interest in politics dummy takes the anticipated positive sign, 
despite being statistically insignificant. It is surprising to observe that Interest in 
politics dummy produced an unexpected negative sign in columns (23)-(26), 
whereas it yielded the anticipated positive sign in columns (27) and (28). Results 
in columns (23)-(26) are statistically insignificant, and those in columns (27) and 
(28) exhibit results statistically significant at the 1 % level. This indicates that a 
male’s political preference is strongly associated with choice of spouse, resulting 
in estimation bias. As a consequence of controlling for this bias, a spouse’s 
political interest increased conservative male support for women’s empowerment, 
but did not influence support in progressive-neutral males. 
Considering the statistical analysis based on the individual data as a whole, 
in general, a male’s political view was affected by his spouse’s characteristics, in 
particular her political interest. This effect was, however, remarkable for 
conservative males but not for progressive-neutral males. That is, the 
conservative male’s view about a women’s issue changed significantly with 
respect to his spouse’s political interest, whereas the progressive or the 
11 
 
progressive-neutral male’s view changed little. An example of a conservative male 
changing his views based on female family influence is represented by John 
Bercow (the new Speaker of the UK House of Commons).11  
 
Conclusion 
A number of research studies have explored how individuals are affected by 
family structure and gender differences among family members. There seems to 
be a difference in values concerning economic policy between genders. For 
instance, females are considered to have an opinion different from males 
concerning size of government and the allocation of public spending (e.g., Abrams 
& Settle, 1998; Aidt & Dallal, 2008; Lott & Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008). Therefore, 
the effect of interaction between genders cannot be neglected when economic 
policy is planned. However, the relationship between an individual’s interest in 
politics and political positions among family members has not been adequately 
considered in these studies. Therefore, this paper explored how the degree of a 
spouse’s political interest affects the male’s view about a women’s issue, using 
individual level data compiled by the JEDS survey. 
Key findings are as follows: (1) The degree of a spouse’s political interest plays 
                                                   
11 John Bercow was a member of the Conservative Monday Club, which promoted a policy of 
voluntary repatriation for non-white immigrants. He later left this club. His ideology has 
moved from far right to the center, apparently at least partly due to his marriage to a 
relatively progressive woman, Sally Illman. He changed his attitude and view concerning, for 
example, non-white immigrants and gays and lesbians 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8114399.stm: accessed on September 1, 2009). 
Regarding this example, I gratefully acknowledge the helpful information provided by a 
referee. 
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a role in whether males consider women’s empowerment important. (2) This 
spouse effect is observed for conservative males but not for progressive-neutral 
males. (3) These results are unchanged when the endogeneity bias caused by 
spouse’s political interest is controlled for. Based on these results, it is argued 
that interaction of political preferences among family members plays a critical 
role in determining views regarding gender issues. 
Compared with the existing literature, the primary contribution of this paper 
is twofold. First, the present study provides an understanding of the effect of 
family structure on an individual’s political view. Second, it elucidates the 
interaction effect of individuals and their family members’ political preferences. 
This paper, however, did not explore the effect of female spouses on male spouses 
regarding various political and economic issues such as optimal size of 
government, public spending, and social welfare. These issues should be 
researched to explore the questions of how and to what extent female views are 
reflected in economic policy through interaction within the family. In addition, 
this paper did not present a theoretical framework on which to base results. 
Finally, the sample size was small in this study, and larger samples are 
recommended in future studies. 
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TABLE 1 
  Sample Construction (Numbers in Samples) 
 
 
Note.  
a. Individual characteristics included male’s age, household income, education, and marital 
status. In addition, the spouse was female.  
b. (I) Sample was used for the estimation reported in Table 3. 
c. (I) Sample was used in Table 2. 
d. (II) Sample was used for the estimation reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All 
 
Males with spouses whose ages 
were available 
Original Sample 
 
1618 746 
Males 
 
749 640 
Views about women’s empowerment and 
respondent characteristics available a 
478  (I) b 472 
Spouse’s interest in politics available 
 
432  (I) b 428  (II) d 
Male’s political position available 
 
419  (I) b,c 415  (II) d 
Male’s political position progressive 
 (Political position value [0-4]) 
73   (I) c 71   (II) d 
Male’s political position progressive-neutral 
(Political position value [ 0-5]) 
239  (I) b, c 235  (II) d 
Male’s political position conservative 
 (Political position value [6-10]) 
180  (I) b, c 180  (II) d  
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                TABLE 2 
         Comparison Between Progressive-Neutral and Conservative Males  
 Progressive 
-Neutral 
Conservative  t-value 
Women’s empowerment considered 
important (Yes = 1, No = 0 
   0.24   0.19 1.74* 
Spouse interested in politics (Yes = 1, 
No = 0 
  0.23   0.21 0.33 
Average age 
 
  51.5   57.5 5.16** 
Average household income  
(millions of yen) 
  612   657 1.41 
Average years of education 
 
  12.2   11.7 2.24* 
 
Note. In the t-value column for the mean comparison test, * and ** denote significance 
of difference at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 TABLE 3 
(A) Probit Model Estimations 
 (1) 
All 
 (2) 
Prog 
 (3) 
Prog 
(4) 
Prog- 
Neutral 
(5) 
Prog- 
Neutral 
(6) 
Conser 
(7) 
Conser 
Spouse dummy -0.03 
(-0.14) 
-0.09 
(-0.15) 
-0.25 
(-0.43) 
-0.16 
(-0.48) 
-0.09 
(-0.29) 
0.11 
(0.21) 
-0.65 
(-1.00) 
Ln (age) 0.07 
(0.29) 
-2.38*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.49 
(-0.78) 
-0.07 
(-0.02) 
-0.14 
(-0.46) 
0.98 
(1.50) 
1.77** 
(3.11) 
Ln (household income) 
 
0.11 
(0.91) 
0.38 
(0.87) 
-0.20 
(-0.54) 
0.12 
(0.76) 
0.09 
(0.58) 
0.53* 
(1.95) 
0.39 
(1.48) 
Ln (years of education) 
 
-0.17 
(-0.59) 
-3.01* 
(-1.94) 
-0.59 
(-0.79) 
-0.64 
(-1.58) 
-0.43 
(-1.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.12) 
0.50 
(0.95) 
Constant 
 
-1.14 
(-0.75) 
13.3*** 
(2.65) 
4.21 
(1.36) 
1.03 
(0.53) 
0.88 
(0.50) 
-7.86* 
(-2.11) 
-11.1*** 
(-3.27) 
Political position 0-10 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 6-10 7-10 
Obs 478 41 78 262 310 194 160 
Wald chi-square 17.8 8.22 3.04 17.4 11.3 28.4 39.7 
 
 
(B)Probit Model Estimations 
 (8) 
All 
 (9) 
Prog 
(10) 
Prog 
(11) 
Progr- 
Neutral 
(12) 
Progr- 
Neutral 
(13) 
Conser 
(14) 
Conser 
Spouse dummy 0.12 
(0.45) 
-0.13 
(-0.20) 
-0.17 
(-0.25) 
0.26 
(0.67) 
0.21 
(0.63) 
0.15 
(0.27) 
-1.18 
(-1.60) 
Spouse dummy*  
Interest in politics 
dummy 
0.28* 
(1.72) 
0.16 
(0.27) 
0.58 
(1.60) 
0.15 
(0.67) 
0.21 
(1.06) 
0.54* 
(1.97) 
0.85** 
(2.52) 
Ln (age) 0.08 
(0.30) 
-2.43* 
(-2.27) 
-0.38 
(-0.59) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
-0.11 
(-0.33) 
0.90 
(1.34) 
2.00*** 
(2.92) 
Ln (household income) 
 
0.18 
(1.34) 
0.36 
(0.80) 
-0.12 
(-0.33) 
0.20 
(1.10) 
0.15 
(0.91) 
0.62** 
(2.15) 
0.64** 
(2.16) 
Ln (years of education) 
 
-0.19 
(-0.62) 
-2.95* 
(-1.82) 
-0.48 
(-0.61) 
-0.71* 
(-1.69) 
-0.47 
(-1.19) 
-0.06 
(-0.12) 
0.61 
(0.98) 
Constant 
 
-1.64 
(-0.99) 
13.5** 
(2.42) 
2.71 
(0.82) 
0.56 
(0.26) 
0.41 
(0.21) 
-8.29* 
(-2.13) 
-13.7*** 
(-3.48) 
Political position 0-10 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 6-10 7-10 
Obs 432 39 73 239 282 180 143 
Wald chi-square 23.5 7.27 3.99 18.2 13.4 33.4 41.1 
 
Note. a. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. Based on 
two-tailed rejection regions, * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. With the exception of (2), (3), (9) and (10), city size and area dummies are 
included, but not reported. 
      b. Women’s empowerment dummy was the dependent variable. 
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                     TABLE 4 
                     Probit Model  
 (15) 
All 
(16) 
Prog 
(17) 
Prog 
(18) 
Prog- 
Neutral 
(19) 
Prog- 
Neutral 
(20) 
Conser 
(21) 
Conser 
Interest in politics 
dummy 
0.28* 
(1.79) 
0.34 
(0.51) 
0.60* 
(1.70) 
0.16 
(0.75) 
0.20 
(1.02) 
0.45* 
(1.72) 
0.96*** 
(3.01) 
Ln (age) 0.15 
(0.56) 
-3.00* 
(-2.27) 
-0.39 
(-0.58) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
1.07* 
(1.66) 
1.92*** 
(1.66) 
Ln (household 
income) 
0.25* 
(1.82) 
0.60 
(1.17) 
-0.04 
(-0.13) 
0.29 
(1.60) 
0.22 
(1.33) 
0.62** 
(2.14) 
0.64** 
(2.04) 
Ln (years of 
education) 
-0.27 
(-0.86) 
-4.31* 
(-1.97) 
-0.65 
(-0.81) 
-0.88** 
(-2.03) 
-0.56 
(-1.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.53 
(0.87) 
Constant 
 
-2.13 
(-1.34) 
17.1** 
(2.32) 
2.53 
(0.75) 
-0.11 
(-0.05) 
-0.17 
(-0.09) 
-8.63* 
(-2.26) 
-14.3*** 
(-3.31) 
Political position 0-10 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 6-10 7-10 
Obs 428 38 71 235 278 180 143 
Wald chi-square 24.6 6.75 4.56 19.7 13.6 29.4 36.3 
 
Note. a. Samples were limited to males with a spouse. Values in parentheses are z-statistics 
calculated by robust standard errors. Based on two-tailed rejection regions,*, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. With the exception of (16) and 
(17), city size and area dummies are included, but not reported.  
      b. Women’s empowerment dummy was the dependent variable 
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               TABLE 5 
IV Probit Model 
 
   
Note. a. Samples were limited to males with a spouse. Values in parentheses are z-statistics 
calculated by robust standard errors. Based on two-tailed rejection regions,*, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. With the exception of (23) and 
(24), city size and area dummies are included, but not reported. Interest in politics dummy 
was treated as an endogenous variable and thus instrumented. Age of spouse was used as an 
instrumental variable.  
      b. Women’s empowerment dummy was the dependent variable. 
 (22)  
All 
(23) 
Prog 
(24) 
Prog 
(25)  
Prog- 
Neutral 
(26)  
Prog- 
Neutral 
(27)  
Conser 
(28)  
Conser 
Interest in 
politics dummy 
1.20 
(0.54) 
-10.6 
(-0.13) 
-0.52 
(-0.03) 
-1.81 
(-0.79) 
-0.75 
(-0.27) 
2.27*** 
(2.66) 
2.82*** 
(12.6) 
Ln (age) 0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.003 
(-0.00) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.54 
(0.95) 
0.21 
(0.28) 
1.05* 
(1.87) 
1.21 
(1.22) 
Ln (household 
income) 
0.22 
(1.30) 
2.88 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.27 
(1.16) 
0.23 
(1.42) 
0.51 
(1.64) 
0.42 
(1.29) 
Ln (years of 
education) 
-0.34 
(-1.08) 
-9.00 
(-0.25) 
-0.89 
(-0.26) 
-0.21 
(-0.16) 
-0.33 
(-0.39) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.28 
(0.55) 
Constant 
 
-1.50 
(-0.59) 
6.08 
(0.07) 
1.27 
(0.07) 
-3.61 
(-0.88) 
-1.73 
(-0.36) 
-8.64* 
(-2.20) 
-9.30*** 
(-4.31) 
Political position 0-10 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 6-10 7-10 
Obs 428 38 71 235 278 180 143 
Wald chi-square 31.3 1.34 1.32 57.8 13.6 117.1 191.3 
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Political Position 
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Note. Values range from 0 (progressive) to 10 (conservative). 
 
 
 
